De l'unité de l'intellect à l'un absolu : Plotin critique d'Aristote
From the Unity of the Intellect to the Absolute One: Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle» CHORA 5/2007, pp. 121-139
In this article, I discuss Plotinus' critique of the peripatetic idea of the divine intellect as first principle. As I am trying to show, Plotinus accepts the unity of the intellect as self-thinking, and, even more than Aristotle, he emphasizes this unity. Yet, he insists on the necessity of a principle that is even higher and simpler than the intellect. Eventually, intellect proves to be the unity of a plurality, though it is the most unitary being. I discuss the dual nature of the intellect: both as thinking and as being, intellect is both unitary and plural. Starting from this, I analyze Plotinus' arguments of the absolute one as first principle, above intellect.